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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a)(Rep.Vol. 9 2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the court of appeals ruled correctly in 
reversing the district court's imposition of a constructive trust. The standard of review on 
certiorari is for correctness. State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is a dispute about the ownership of real property between Arnold Dwayne 
Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings (the Rawlings Petitioners), Theron LaRell Rawlings, Bryce 
C. Rawlings and Carol Lynn R. Masterson (the Masterson Petitioners) and Donald and 
Jeanette Rawlings (Donald and Jeanette). In the trial court, all of the petitioners alleged that 
a 1967 warranty deed executed in favor of Donald and Jeanette by Arnold Rawlings and his 
wife, Cleo Rawlings, was intended to convey property in trust for the benefit of Cleo 
Rawlings and all of her children. 
The case was tried to the court in a four day bench trial from March 12, 2007 through 
March 15, 2007. The court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
imposing a constructive trust and certifying its order as a final judgment, pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on August 24, 2007. 
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Donald and Jeanette appealed, which appeal was transferred by this Court to the 
court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the order of the trial court and held that 
judgment should be entered for Donald and Jeanette. 
This Court thereafter granted certiorari to review the question of whether the court 
of appeals was correct in reversing the order of the trial court. 
On March 24, 1967, Arnold Rawlings and his wife, Cleo Rawlings, executed a 
warranty deed in favor of their son, Donald Rawlings, and his wife, Jeanette Rawlings, 
for the property which is the subject of this appeal. On that same day, each of Arnold and 
Cleo's other children (and Dwayne Rawlings' spouse, Paulette) executed quit claim deeds 
for this same property in favor of Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings. (R. 1449, 
Exhibits 12 and 13). 
While the warranty deed was absolute on its face, two of the petitioners testified 
that their father told them that the property was being deeded to Donald to avoid having 
the property taken by the welfare department, which was paying for Arnold's cancer 
treatment. LaRell Rawlings testified that his father offered to give him the property 
outright, but ultimately decided to deed it to Donald "to take care of mother, and then us, 
after she passed away." (R. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, at p. 50). 
Dwayne Rawlings testified that on approximately March 22, 1967, his father "just 
said that they were going to put it in Donald's name, and that he had to get it out of his 
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name. They were going to put it in Donald's name, and it would be held for the family." 
(R. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, p. 381.) The other two Rawlings' children admitted that their 
father never told them anything about the property being held in trust. (R. 1451, Trans. 
Vol. II, pp. 257-58; 307.) 
Carol Masterson admitted that her mother, Cleo, always insisted that the property 
was deeded to Donald and Jeanette because they had paid off the mortgage on the 
property. 
Q. But every time that that question came up, your mother 
consistently said that the property was deeded to 
Donald and Jeanette because they paid off the 
mortgage; isn't that true? 
A. That's true. 
(R. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, p. 308.) 
LaRell Rawlings admitted as much as well. Talking about his mother, LaRell testified as 
follows: 
Q. And the story she told was that the property was 
deeded to Donald and Jeanette because they paid off 
the mortgage? 
A. Correct. 
(R. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 148.) 
Bryce Rawlings concurred. 
Q. My question is really, that your mother has told you, 
has she not, that the reason the property was deeded to 
Donald and Jeanette was because they paid off the 
mortgage? 
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A. That's what she always said. 
(R. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, pp. 263-64.) 
The evidence presented regarding payment of the mortgage was that Arnold 
Rawlings approached Donald Rawlings in approximately April of 1966 about needing 
money to make mortgage payments to Walker Bank. Donald testified that he gave his 
father money a couple of times and when his father asked a third time, Donald went to the 
bank to talk to an employee about his father's loan. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, pp. 535-
36.) Jeanette Rawlings testified that thereafter she made 7 payments on the mortgage 
(Exhibits 72 through 78) concluding with a $579.06 payment on December 29, 1966, at 
which time she received a deed of reconveyance from the bank. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, 
pp. 611-13; Exhibit 51.) 
In addition to these payments, Jeanette Rawlings testified that on March 24, 1967, 
she paid $1,267.00 to take care of back taxes, of which she received reimbursement of 
$500.00 from Dwayne Rawlings (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, p. 614). Dwayne Rawlings 
testified that he gave her $1,000.00. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, p. 418.) 
By 1974, a controversy had developed regarding the Vineyard Meadows 
subdivision which had been developed on the southern border of the subject property. 
Donald Rawlings asked each of the petitioners to sign a second quit claim deed, with a 
corrected property description, to assist him in litigation with lot owners who he alleged 
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were encroaching on the subject property. Each did so. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, p. 556.) 
This litigation resulted in the recovery by Donald of approximately $52,000.00. (R. 1459, 
Trans. Vol. Ill, p. 585.) 
In addition to the evidence of conversations between Dwayne and LaRell with 
their father, petitioners believe their claim was supported by evidence that Arnold 
Rawlings continued to use and refer to the property as his own even after 1967 (Exhibits 
19 through 29); that each of the petitioners continued to have access to the property to 
pick fruit for their mother's benefit; and that Donald told Dwayne that the execution of 
the 1974 quit claim deeds was necessary to protect "mother's farm." 
Both groups of petitioners make factual misrepresentations in their briefs in this 
Court. For example, both of petitioners' briefs assert that either Cleo or Arnold paid 
taxes on the property after the conveyance in 1967. This is simply untrue. Once, in 1971, 
Cleo paid a small amount for taxes which had been assessed in 1966. (Exhibit 59.) 
The Masterson Petitioners contend that Donald never denied being told that the 
property was being placed in his name to hold for the family. In reality, Donald testified 
as follows: 
Q. Mr. Rawlings, at any time between the time when you 
learned that your father had cancer and the date of the 
deed on March 24, 1967, did your father indicate to 
you that he was deeding the property to you to hold for 
anyone else? 
A. He did not. 
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(R. 1451 Trans. Vol. IV at p. 653.) 
The petitioners are free to not believe Donald's testimony but they are not free to 
misrepresent it. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals' decision is a correct application of established Utah law, which 
provides that if a party intends to convey property in trust for the benefit of a third party, but 
there is no writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the transferee of the property holds title 
for the benefit of the third party, if, but only if, the transferee was in a confidential 
relationship with the transferor. 
The trial court expressly found that Arnold Rawlings did not intend the 1967 deed to 
be a conveyance of his ownership of the property. In reliance of this finding, the court of 
appeals correctly held that if no conveyance was intended, then, by definition, no 
conveyance in trust could have been intended. 
The court of appeals also ruled correctly that no equitable remedy of constructive 
trust was available because no unjust enrichment had occurred where the petitioners' only 
claim of wrongdoing on the part of Donald and Jeannette was their failing to honor the 
alleged express oral trust. 
The petitioners attempt to convert the trial court's finding of no conveyance into a 
purported finding of a conveyance into trust is illogical, without any basis in the evidence 
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and is of no legal significance as it relates to the petitioners' claimed interest in the 
property. 
The petitioners' argument concerning the propriety of the imposition of an equitable 
constructive trust as a remedy for unjust enrichment also ignores the fact that any such 
claim was subject of a four year statute of limitation, which ran 26 years before the present 
action was filed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS A CORRECT 
APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW. 
The decision of the court of appeals under review is a straight forward application of 
established precedent from this Court. In Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), this 
Court expressly adopted § 45 of the Restatement 2d of Trusts, which provides that if a 
grantor conveys property with the intent that it be held in trust for others but there is no 
writing which would satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the transferee holds the property in trust 
if, but only if, the transferee was in a confidential relationship with the transferor. 
In the court of appeals, Donald and Jeanette argued that the trial court's decision to 
impose a constructive trust was not supported by the evidence because there was no 
evidence offered that Arnold was in a confidential relationship with Donald and Jeanette at 
the time of the 1967 conveyance. The court of appeals found it unnecessary to consider this 
argument because of the trial court's finding that Arnold had no intent to convey his 
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property. 
Here, as found by the district court, Arnold did not intend to 
transfer the farm at all, and we can thus conclude only that he 
did not intend to transfer the farm into trust. 
Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App. 478, f 22. 
The court of appeals went on to note that if Donald and Jeanette weren't acting as 
express trustees they did nothing which would warrant imposition of a constructive trust 
as a remedy for unjust enrichment. 
The problem with the application of the [petitioners'] 
approach to the circumstances of this case is that the only 
wrongful act alleged by the [petitioners] is [Donald and 
Jeanette's] failure to comply with Arnold's expressed 
intentions at the time of the transfer. If Arnold did not have 
and express an intent that the 1967 deed transfer the farm 
property to [Donald and Jeanette] in trust, then [Donald and 
Jeanette's] taking of the farm property in fee simple under the 
express language of the deed cannot be deemed wrongful. 
Id. at TJ 17. 
The petitioners' suggestion that § 45 of the Restatement 2d of Trusts supports the 
trial court's imposition of a constructive trust in favor of the petitioners is belied by their 
own argument. They assert that Arnold intended to retain beneficial title to the property 
in himself. If such was the case, then the principles set forth in § 44 of the Restatement 
2d might be implicated, but not § 45, which deals with express trusts for the benefit of 
third parties. Petitioners, however, would be strangers to any such conveyance from 
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Arnold to Donald and Jeanette wherein Arnold retained beneficial title and could acquire 
no rights thereunder. Petitioners offer no explanation of how Arnold's asserted retention 
of beneficial interest in the farm gives them any rights in the property whatsoever. 
Furthermore, the Court could nol have relied on § 45 of the Restatement 2d 
because it made no finding that Arnold intended to convey his property in trust for the 
petitioners (and, indeed, made a contrary finding) and made no determination that Arnold 
was in a confidential relationship with Donald and Jeanette as would be required to 
invoke § 45. See Nielson v. Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 511 (Utah 1976). 
The petitioners make their conclusory arguments about the existence of an express 
trust without stopping to think about what they are actually asserting; namely, that Arnold 
was the purported beneficiary of the trust arrangement for which they argue, not the 
petitioners. Accordingly, the existence of any such trust could not be the basis for any 
judicial remedy in favor of the petitioners. 
At one point in their brief, the Masterson Petitioners ask the rhetorical question 
"Why would the trial court state that a transfer of ownership rights was not intended and 
yet still impose a constructive trust?" Brief of Masterson Petitioners at p. 16. 
The answer is simple. The petitioners argued in the trial court, as they do in this 
court, that the court had boundless authority to impose a constructive trust for virtually 
any reason. This is simply not the law. UA constructive trust is an equitable remedy to 
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prevent unjust enrichment." Matter of Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111,1114 (Utah 1982). 
As noted by the court of appeals, in the absence of an enforceable express oral 
trust, there is nothing unjust in Donald and Jeanette using the property for their own 
benefit. 
To the extent the petitioners are now asserting that a constructive trust is an 
appropriate remedy not for a failed oral express trust but rather for some unspecified 
"unjust enrichment" in the acquisition of the property, under what the Masterson 
Petitioners call the "undefined constructive trust doctrine" (see Masterson Petitioners' 
brief at p. 19), this cause of action is subject to a four year statute of limitations. See 
Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App. 316. In the absence of an 
express trust, the statute began to run on the date the deed was delivered. See Baker v. 
Pattee, 684 P.2d 631 (Utah 1984) (holding that a claim that a deed wasn't intended as a 
conveyance must be brought within 4 years of delivery of deed). 
The Masterson Petitioners' arguments regarding tolling of the limitations period are 
only valid as against an express trustee and have no application to a claim arising from an 
asserted unjust enrichment. Equitable claims, such as unjust enrichment, are subject to 
Utah's four year statute of limitations. See Bartel v. Hill, 2002 UT App. 158. This statute 
ran 26 years before the petitioners filed their claim. 
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POINT II. THE PETITIONERS' ARGUMENT THAT ARNOLD INTENDED TO 
CONVEY THE PROPERTY IN TRUST FOR HIMSELF PROVIDES 
NO BASIS FOR IMPOSITION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN 
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS. 
Both groups of petitioners argue that when the trial court found that "Arnold did 
not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the property," 
(Finding 62), what the trial court really meant was that Arnold considered the conveyance 
to be one in trust for his benefit. Even if the finding was susceptible to such a convoluted 
and strained interpretation, which argument is being made for the first time in this Court, 
and for which there is no evidentiary support, it would avail the petitioners of nothing. If 
Arnold would have been the beneficial owner of the property at the time of his death in 
1971, such ownership interest would have been inherited by his wife, Cleo. See Utah 
Code Ann. §75-2-102 (Rep.Vol. 8A 1993). When she so inherited, her interest would 
have immediately passed to Donald and Jeanette because she signed the warranty deed. 
See Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 2002 UT 721 (warranty deed passes after acquired 
title). 
What none of the petitioners even attempt to do is explain how, if Arnold didn't 
intend to pass beneficial title to the property, his retention of beneficial title somehow 
inures to their benefit. Their argument that the court of appeals somehow misconstrued 
the trial court's finding and, therefore, should have upheld the trial court's ruling, is a non 
sequitur. If, as found by the trial court, Arnold didn't intend the 1967 deed to be a 
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conveyance of his ownership of the property, then by definition it wasn't a conveyance to 
the petitioners and gives them no interest whatsoever in the property. 
When a settlor conveys property into trust for the benefit of others he no longer has 
any ownership interest in the property. See Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65. Accordingly, 
the trial court's finding that Arnold didn't intend to transfer his ownership of the property 
is an express finding that he didn't intend to convey the property in trust for the benefit of 
the petitioners. In the absence of such a conveyance the petitioners have no claim against 
the property of any nature. 
POINT III. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD 
OF REVIEW. 
The Masterson Petitioners are in error regarding the standard of review. While 
they repeatedly assert that a trial court decision to impose a constructive trust is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion, they fail to understand that the decision regarding whether the 
facts warrant the imposition of a constructive trust is a legal conclusion, reviewed for 
correctness. 
As this Court noted in Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 
[t]he availability of a remedy is a legal conclusion that we 
review for correctness. However, "a trial is accorded 
considerable latitude and discretion in applying and 
formulating an equitable remedy, and [it] will not be 
overturned unless it [has] abused its discretion." 
Id. at 142 (citation omitted). 
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This Court cited Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995), as 
holding that the availability of an equitable remedy is 
reviewed for correctness but that the trial court's application 
and formulation of an equitable remedy is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. 
2008 UT at n.38 (emphasis in the original). 
Ironically, these petitioners cite Thurston for the contrary proposition when their 
counsel was ethically obligated to cite both of the cases noted above as controlling 
authority contrary to their position. See Rule 3.3(a)(2) of the Supreme Court Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
The statement of the court of appeals that it reviews the legal requirements for the 
imposition of a constructive trust for correctness is an entirely accurate articulation of its 
duty as set forth by this Court. 
POINT IV. RESPONDENTS HAD NO DUTY TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
The Masterson Petitioners complain here, as they did in the court of appeals, about 
Donald and Jeanette's failure to marshal the evidence, once again ignoring the fact that 
Donald and Jeanette didn't challenge the trial court's findings, but rather its legal 
conclusions. "[T]he marshaling requirement applies only to challenges of factual 
findings, not conclusions of law." Eggert v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2006 UT 28, j^ 37. 
In this Court, they assert Donald and Jeanette needed to marshal the evidence to 
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permit the court of appeals to reverse the trial court's findings of fact, which they assert it 
did. Brief of Masterson Petitioners at p. 24. The court of appeals did no such thing. It 
expressly relied on the trial court's finding of facts, particularly finding number 62, in 
reaching its decision. 
We agree with [Donald and Jeanette] that there is no 
enforceable unwritten express trust in this case, although we do 
so based on the district court's findings rather than on our own 
evaluation of the evidence presented below. 
Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT 478, f 21. 
The petitioners' contention that the court of appeals reversed the trial court's 
findings of fact is mystifying. It seems to be borne of their belief that when the trial court 
found an absence of intent on Arnold's part to convey the property, it was really finding 
that he intended to convey it in trust. Therefore, one must assume the argument goes, 
when the appellate court didn't understand that the trial court did not mean what it 
expressly said, the appellate court reversed the finding of fact the trial court intended to 
make, but didn't. This makes no sense. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court's factual finding that 
Arnold Rawlings' lack of intent to convey his ownership of his property precluded a 
determination that he intended to convey the property in trust for the benefit of the 
petitioners, which was petitioners' burden to establish in order to challenge the validity of 
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a warranty deed conveying fee simple title Accordingly, the court of appeals' reversal of 
the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust was a correct ruling which should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this Jfrj. day of June, 2009 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By 
M 
ft. JfLJ IILJH* 
A. David Eckersley ^ ^ ^ 
attorneys for Respondents 
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